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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GROVER THOMPSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 6655
JOHN E. IIARRis, Warden of _the
Utah State Penitentiary,
Defendant.

Petition For Rehearing

Comes now Grover Thompson, Plaintiff in the above
entitled case, and respectfully petitions this Honorable
Oourt for a rehearing in said case upon the following
grounds, to-wit :
(1) The Court erred in holding that plaintiff was
not denied his liberty without due process of
law by the trial court, and erred in failing to discharge him from custody upon that ground.
(2) Even if the plaintiff had received a fair and impartial trial in the court below, nevertheless the
Court erred in failing to hold that the sentence
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was void and in failing to discharge the plaintiff
from custody under the sentence.
DoROTHEA MERRILL DRYER,

Attorney for Plaintiff,
Amicus Curiae, by appointment of the Su;preme Court.

CERTIFICATE
I, the undersigned and attorney for plaintiff above
named, do hereby ·Certify that in my opinion there is good
reason to helieve that the judgment rendered by this
Court in this action is erroneous, and that the cause
should be re-examined.
DoRoTHEA MERRILL DRYER,

Attorney for Plaintiff,
Amicus Curiae, by appoin,tment of the Supreme Court.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR
REHEARING
POINT

I.

IT IS SUIB'M:.IT'T'E[) THAT THE COURIT ER!ThEID IN HOLDING
THkT P:LAIN'l'I•FF WAS NOT DIDNIE.D HIS L1IBERTY WITH·

OUT DUE PIROCESS OF LAW BY THE T'RIAL OOURT, AND
IDRRED IN FALLING TO DISCHARGE HIM FROM CUSTODY
ON THAT GIROUND.

Provisions safeguarding civil rights thru assertion
of the right to due process of law appear both in Amend-
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XIV, Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States,
and in the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article 1,
Section 7, as follows:
Constitution of the United States:

"* * * nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.''
Constitution of the State of Utah:
''No person· shall be deprived of life, liberty
or property, ·without due process of law.''
To ascertain the meaning of this guarantee, we must
look to the case law. In the recent case of Lisenba v. People, 60S. Ct. 280, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), the Supreme Court
of the United States spoke authoritatively upon the application of the concept of due process of law in criminal
cases. There an accused murderer claimed that confes·sions illegally extorted were used in evidence against
him. The .court, after rejecting his claim, set out the
test to be followed in these words (at p. 236):
''The aim of the requirement of due process
is not to exclude _presumptively false evidence, but
to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of
evidence.
''As applied to a criminal trial, denial of due
process is the failure to observe that funda!lle~tal
fairness essential to the very concept of Justice.
In order to declare a denial of it we must find that
the absence of that fairness fatally infected the
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trial; the acts complained of must be of such
quality as neces,sarily prevents a fair trial.''
D1oes the procedure followed by the trial court meet
this test? We submit that it does not. We submit that
in the light of this test the proceedings below were characterized by unfairness going to their very heart, were
fatally infected by unfairness in the use of evidence, and
that the unfairness was of such quality and significance
as necessarily to prevent a fair trial.
In support of this position, there are many cases in
which proceedings such as those here below have been
severely censured by learned courts, both English and
American, over a long period of years. Probably the
most complete and explicit opinion on this point was written by the Connecticut Supren1e Court, speaking unanimously, in the case of State v. Ferrone, 113 A. 452, 96
Conn. 160 (1921). In that case, the defendant was convicted of having by night possession of burglar's tools or
instruments of housebreaking without legal excuse. The
information had further alleged that ''twice before the
date of the alleged crime he had been convicted, sentenced, and imprisoned in a state prison.'' The Connecticut Supreme Gourt held that the trial court had properly
refused to strike out of the information the statements
relating to former convictions (Connecticut evidently
having no statute such as Section 105-21-27, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943), but it reversed the decision and ordered
a new trial because of the manifest unfairness of the p·roceedings below, saying :
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"But in State v. Reilly, 94 Conn. 698, we further said, on page 705 (110 A. 550, 553) that in
such an inforrnation 'two separate issues are presented: First, ·was the defendant guilty of the
crime charg·ed "? This relates to the crime only.
Second, if guilty, had the defendant twice before
been convicted, sentenced and imprisoned'? This
relates to the penalty only, and does not involve or
state any other or different crime fron1 that first
stated. The jury must by their verdict answer
each of these issues.' This plainly indicates that
the first issue should be taken up and tried by the
jury first and separately ; and, if the accused be
found guilty on this issue·, then the second issue
should be tried; and, if the accused be found guilty
on this issue also, then the maximun1 punishment
prescribed by the statute must be the sentence of
the court. It cannot be believed that an accu,sed
man would ever haPe a fair trial, resulting in a
verdict not affected by prejttdice or by considerations by which the jury should not be influenced,
if during the trial allegations that he had twice
before been convicted of state prison crimes have
been read to the jury, and evidence of his former
convictions have been· placed before them. It is
beyond question that knowledge of such facts must
necessarily prejudice the minds of his triers
against the a.ccused, and cause him more serious
injury than that which he would sttffer from any
improper remarks of the state's attorney. No one
would claim that in a trial for a specific crime
evidence of another crime connnitted by the accused could be admitted for the purpose of proving his guilt of the crime alleged. The purpose of
a criminal trial in this state is not more to punish
the guilty than to discharge the innocent. Whatever may have been the previous offenses or the
bad character of the accused, the law surrounds
him with the presun1ption that he is innocent of
the specific crime with which he is charged, and,
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while that presumption has no evidential force, it
casts upon the state the burden of proving that
the accused is guilty of that specific crime by evidence of facts material and relevant to that crime.
State v. Smith, 65 Conn. 283, 31 A. 206. Upon such
evidence only, the jury are sworn to render their
verdict. A man is not to be convicted of one crime
by proof that he is guilty of another. Therefore,
our law sedulously guards against the introduction of evidence of any matter immaterial or irrelevant to the single issue to be determined. The
purpose of these salutary laws might often be defeated if the minds of the jurors were subjected to .
the influence of facts or considerations having no
legitimate bearing on the only question they have
to decide, and their verdict be reached under the
impulse of passion, sympathy, or resentment. Such
a verdict is illegal and could be set aside. The
rule everywhere enforced excludes not only the
evidence of another ·crime, but also evidence tending to degrade the accused, to prejudice the jury
against him, to divert their minds from the real
issue which they have to determine, or to persuade them by matters which they have no legal
right to consider that the accused, for reasons
other than those based upon legitimate evidence,
was more likely to have committed the particular
crime for which he is on trial.
"As we said .in State Reilly, supra, such an
information as this presents two separate issues,
and the issue of former convictions does not relate
to the issue of the commission of the specific crime
alleged~ and for which only the accused is to be
tried, and the fact of former convictions does not
tend in any way to prove the commission of the
·crime charged. It follows that, until the verdict
of the jury on the principal issue has been rendered, no knowledge of the alleged previous convictions should reach them, either by reading that
part of the information in which they are recited
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or by evidence relating to them. If the verdict
on the principal issue be guilty, then the second
issue may be sub1ni tted to the jury.
"In the absence of statutory regulation in this
state, it is our opinion that a procedure similar to
that prescribed by an English statute should be
followed. 24 and 25 Viet. c. 99, Section 37 ~ Reg.
v. :Martin, L. R. C. C. 214. The information should
be divided into two parts. In the first the particular offense with which the accused is charged
should be set forth, and this should be upon the
first page of the information and signed by the
prosecuting officer. In the second part former convictions should be alleged, and thfs should be upon
the second page of the information, separable
from the first page and signed by the prosecuting
officer. The entire information should be read to
the accused and his plea taken in the absence of
the jurors. When the jury has been impaneled
and sworn, the clerk should read to them only that
part of the information which sets forth the crime
for which the accused is to be tried. The trial
should then proceed in every respect as if there
were no allegations of former convictions, of which
no mention should be made in the evidence, or in
the remarks of counsel, or in the charge of the
court. When the jury retire to consider their verdict, only the first page of the information, on
which the crime charged is set out, should be given
to them. If they return a verdict of guilty, the
second part of the information, in which former
convictions are alleged, should be read to them
without reswearing them, and they should be
charged to inquire on that issue. Of course, the
accused may plead guilty to this part of the information, and then no further proceedings before
or by the jury would be necessary. No reason appears why the accused, if he should choose, ~ight
not submit this issue to the court without the Jury.
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"In this way the well recognized rights of an
accused person will be protected, and the prin·ciples of justice and our long established laws
which have been designed to secure an impartial
trial in every criminal cause will be recognized,
respected and obeyed.
"There is error and a new trial is ordered."
(Italics ours.)
It may be of interest that upon retrial of the Ferrone
case, the Connecticut Supreme Court again reversed defendant's conviction, for the reason that the state's attorney persisted in attempting to introduce evidence of the
prior convictions during the trial of the aceused on the
main charge. See 116 A. 336, 77 Conn. 258 (1922). In
State v. Delmonto, 147 A. 825, 110 Oonn. 298 (1929), the
court followed 'State v. Ferrone, remarking: "We there
outlined the procedure to be followed in this state in the
absence of statutory regulation.''
The principles enunciated in the Ferrone case approved in the following cases: State v. Bailey (La.; 1928),
115 So. 613, at 616, cited in 16 C. J., § 3161, p. 1343; People v. J(ing (lll. ~ 1916), 114 N. E. 601; People v. Kirkpatrick (Wash.; 135), 43 P. (2d) 45; Robertson v. State
(1940), 29 AI. 399, 197 So. 73, cert. den. (1940) 240 Ala.
51, 197 :So. 75, 139 A. L. R. 673, at 686; Lev.ell v. Simpson,
Warden, 142 Kan. 892, 52 P. (2d) 372, 297 U. S. 695;
Glover v. Simpson, Warden, 144 Kan. 153, 58 P. (2d) 73,
299 u. s. 506.
The most cited English case .on this point, which is
discussed at length and is the basis for the decision in the
leading American case of Graham v. West Virginia, 224
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U. S. 616, 32 S. Ct. 583 (1912), noted in 26 Harvard Law
Review at page 84, is Regina v. George Shuttleworth, 3
C. and K. 375, T. and }I. 626, 2 Den. C. C., 351, 5 Cox,
C. C. 369, 21 L. J., M. C. 36, 15 Jur. 1066, Vol. 2, Mews
Common Law Digest p. 2386, ( 1851). In that case, the
prisoner was arraigned on an indictment charging him
with larceny, and also with having been previously convited of a felony. The reporter's account of the proceedings is as follows:
''According to the invariable practice in that
Court [Sessions for the borough of Manchester],
before that time, both counts were read to the
prisoner, and he pleaded not guilty to the whole
indictment. At the trial, the count for larceny
only was read by the clerk of the peace to the
jury, and the witnesses in support of that charge
were heard, and the jury found the prisoner
guilty. The clerk of the peace then proceeded to
read to the jury the further charge, that the prisoner had been previously convicted of a felony,
when the Counsel for the prisoner objected that
that charge could not be gone into; and he further
stated that it was his intention, however the Court
might decide that question, to move in arrest of
judgment generally. The court proceeded, the
identity of the prisoner was proved, and the jury
found prisoner had been previously convicted of
a felony. Appeal was taken to the Court of
Criminal Appeal, which held that the sentence.
under the circumstances was legal. Lord Campbell 'said that the matter admitted of no doubt.
The prisoner, added his Lordship, is first to be
arraigned on the whole indictment, including the
count on the previous conviction: afterwards he
is to be given in charge to the jury on the crime
for which he is indicted, only, and the count charg-
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ing a previous conviction is not to be stated to
the jury till they have given their verdict on the
subsequent felony. It is also the opinion of all
the Judges, that it is unnecessary for the jury to
be sworn again when trying the question. of previous convictions.' Alderson, B. - That has the full
concurrence of all the Judges. The practice is
precisely as it was before.' " [Before 14 and 15
Viet. c. 19, Section 9; note that this was a five
judge court.]
It appears from Wigmore, on ''Evidence,'' 9th Edition, in Section 194, cited hy this court in its opinion in
Thompson v. Harris, ---- P. (2d) ____ (1943), that the rule
of exclusion of evidence of prior convictions was first
establish~d by the English ·courts, themselves, and was
in use at least as early as 1684, at Hamden's Trial. Certainly it is true that this common law rule was in force
long before the adoption of the Utah Constitution and it
appears that this con1n1on law rule governed English procedure long prior to the adoption of the Constitution of
the United States.
Section 105-:21-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which
forbids allegations of prior crimes in informations or indictments unless necessary to the main charge, reinforces the policy of the common law as to exclusion of
evidence and goes a considerable step further in protecting the rights of the accused, in that it attempts to render
impossible even the separable indictment, one part of
which only could be read to the jury in advance of a verdict of guilty, namely, the part alleging the substantive
crime. See State v. Ferrone, supra; Regina v. Shu.ttleworth, supra.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
But if Section 105-21-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1943,
were not our statutory law, the common law rule would
forbid such procedure as was followed below, since the
common law of England, so far as not repugnant to the
Constitutions of the United States and of Utah, "shall
be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.'' See
Section 88-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.
The three leading An1erican cases relating to habitual criminal laws, J.ll oore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673 (1895),
McDonald v. llfassachusetts, 180 U. S. 311, 21 S. Ct. 389,
45 L. Ed. 542 (1901), and Graham v. West Virginia, 224
U. 8. 616, 32 S. Ct. 583 (1912), establish generally that
such laws are valid, per se, and that they do not deprive
an accused of the equal protection of the laws, put him
twice in jeopardy, or constitute cruel and unusual punishment. The question of due process of law here involved,
i.e., the fundamental unfairness of the introduction of
evidence of prior convictions, was not however, decided
in these cases.
In Moore v. Missouri, the pleadings appear to have
raised this question among others, that ''the indictment
in charging the former convictions attacked the defendant's character when not in issue.'' The opinion ruled on
the questions of equal protection, double jeopardy, and
cruel and unusual punishments, but did not rule on the
question quoted, and it does not appear from the opinion
whether the former convictions were presented to the
jury before or after the verdict on the main offense.
McDonald v. Massachusetts, which upheld a statute iden-
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tical to ours, ruled on these points and in addition held
that the statute was not ex post facto, and that no federal
question was presented by the fact that the judge instructed the jury on the habitual criminal charge
after verdict on the mai:Q offense. And in the leading, definit\t).,case of GrahaJm. v. West Virginia, the
court established the rule that a determination as to
habitual criminality may be made in a subsequent or
ancillary proceeding. The court relied primarily upon
Regina v•. Shuttleworth, cited supra, and thereby inferentially approved the rule of exclusion of allegations or
proof of prior ·crimes before verdict on the main offense.
Although these cases do not specifically pass on the aspect
of due process herein presented, they are consistent with
the common law rule. It is therefore permissible to infer
that were the question in the instant case presented to
the United State Supreme Court, it would solemnly frown·
upon the procedure followed below.
\
To sum up, the effect of the American and English
cases, together with the effect of Sections 105-21-27 and.
105-1-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, is clearly this, that
the form for charging habitual criminality, set forth in
Section 105-21-47, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, may be
properly used only in one of two ways:
(1) In a proper case, the indictment, information, or
other vehicle for charging habitual criminality,
reciting the fact of three convictions rather than
combining a recital of two convictions with an
accusation of a· third crime not yet adjudicated,
may be submitted to the same jury which tried
the defendant iipon the substantive crime, once
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that jury has found the accused guilty of the
substantive crime, or,
(2) In a proper case, the vehicle for charging habitual criminality may be used in a proceeding subsequent or ancillary to the trial on the main
charge.
Note that it is at the trial for the main offense, only,
where all the facts requisite to that crime are in issue,
that the jury's judgment regarding these facts is prejudiced by knowledge of prior convictions. Where the
verdict of guilty of the main crime has been rendered,
only the question of whether or not the defendant was
in truth previously convicted would be in issue. Note,
also, that as practical matter, the use of the subsequent
or ancillary proceeding would normally be restricted to
the situation in which the previous crimes were unknown
to the prosecutor at the time of the trial of the main
charge. But this is not always so. For example, see the
case of State v. Smith, 273 P. 323, 128 Ore. 515 (1929),
which describes the practice under the Oregon statute
providing for a special supplementary proceeding.
We should now examine the specific ways in which a
procedure such as that followed below affects the right of
an accused to a fair and impartial trial. In this connection, reference should be made to the information which
is set out verbatim on page 2 of the first brief in this case.
It is not a separable information, as required by the
Ferrone case, and Regina v. Shuttleworth. It accuses
relator ''of the Crime of RoBBERY AND BEING AN HABITUAL
CRIMINAL'' and alleges the commissions and convictions
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of two prior crimes, describing them at length, contrary
to the specific statutory prohibition of Section 105-21-27,
Utah Code .Annotated, 1943. That this entire information was read to the jury at the commencement of the
proceedings in the trial court goes without saying.
Such a procedure has certain obvious effects, which
hear study:
FIRsT. The jury is apprised of the previous crimes
as soon as it has been impaneled. This occurs although
it is well established that the state cannot, in a criminal
proceeding, introduce evidence attacking the character
of the accused, unless the accused first puts his good
character in issue by introducing evidence to sustain his
good character or reputation or has become a witness in
his own behalf. This is true because the ·character of a
person accused of crime is not a fact in issue on a prosecution for such crime. See 20 .Am. J ur. S. 325; Wigmore,
supra, S:S. 57, 58.
In the case of State v. Devlin, 258 P. 826, 145 Wash.
44 (1927), this matter is dealt with explicitly. The court
there quotes from the opinion in the second Ferrone case:
'' 'Evidence tending to show the commission
of other crimes of the part of the accused, or facts
disclosing his bad character or repute, are not
rna terial or relevant to the charge against the accused and should never be permitted to be introduced, for the purpose can be none other than to
prejudice the jury against the accused, and hence
to deny him the fair trial which the law guarantees
him of being proved guilty of the crime with which
he stands charged by evidence which the law ac-
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cepts. None of the conversations between Higgins
and the accused was admissible. It was obviously
intended for the purpose of picturing the accused
as a notorious crin1inal.' ''
The opinion continues:
''The question involved is that of a fair trial,
a right vouchsafed by the direct written law of
the people of the state. It partakes of the character of fair play, which pervades all the activities
of the An1erican people whether in their sports,
business, society, religion, or the law. In the
maintenance of g·overnment to the extent that it
is committed to the courts and lawyers in the
administration of the criminal law it is ju~t as essential that one accused of crime shall have a fair
trial as it is that he be tried at all, whether he be
guilty or not, has his picture in the rogues' gallery
or not.''
The court then quotes from Hurd v. People, 25 Mich.
405 (1872):
"Unfair means may happen to result in doing
justice to the prisoner in the particular cases, yet, ·
justice so attained is injust and dangerous to the
whole community.''
In the main, there are two lines of cases which contravene or appear to contravene the established rule of
fairness in the exclusion of evidence immaterial to the
cause and prejudicial to the accused. The first type is
illustrated by People v. Sickles, 156 N. Y. 541, 51 N. E.
288 (1898), noted in 24 L. R. A. N. S. at p. 432, in which
a strong and well reasoned dissenting opinion was written, and Rains v'. State, 142 Neb. 284, 5 N. W. (2d) 887

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

16
(1942), which is the only case of which we are aware explicitly holding that a procedure such as that of the trial
court in the case at bar is not violative of due process
of law. With the exception of the Rains case, none of
these cases presents a ruling on the question of due process of law here in issue, and the Rains case has several
peculiarities. The court in that case cites as it authority
the Nebraska cases of Kwwitzky v. O'Grady, 135 Neb.
466, 282 N. W. 396, at 399, and Taylor v. State, J14 Neb.
257, 207 N. W. 207, at 209. The Taylor case merely states
that if the prosecution desired to punish under the habitual criminal act, prior convictions could be set out in the
same count of the indictment. Tpis indicates that the
state has rejected the English rule and lacks any statute
corresponding to 'Section 105-21-27, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. The Kuwitzky case holds that since the
habitual criminal act occurs in the chapter on "Criminal
Procedure'' in the Nebraska code, the trial ·court was
without power to render a distinct and separate judgment and sentence upon the habitual criminal count of
the information. The court cites McDonald v. Massadhu.setts, supra, in support of this proposition, neglecting
altogether the leading case of Graham v. West Virgilnia,
supra, which flatly holds that a determination as to
habitual criminality may be made in separate or ancillary
proceedings.
The second line of cases which appear to contravene
the established rule of fairness is illustrated by the case
of Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293 (1922), which
holds that under the National Prohibition Act, providing
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more severe punishments for subsequent offenses than
for a first offense, and requiring a previous conviction
to be pleaded in the indictn1ent, it was not error to permit
the prosecuting attorney to read to the jury an indictment containing an allegation that the accused had been
previously convicted of a similar crime. This holding
corresponds to holdings in the state liquor cases and
Federal Narcotics Law cases. Almost all of these cases
go off on the theory that the former conviction is a necessary ingredient of the second or subsequent offense,
i.e., a previous misdemeanor conviction may be a necessary ingredient in a felony charge. This is not the theory
of habitual criminal laws. Moreover, it is extremely important to note that even here the only kind of previous
conviction which may be brought to the attention of the
jury by means of indictment or information is a conviction of a similar crime. Such evidence might be deemed
to he of some probative value, in that a person who
persistently violated the liquor law might properly be
thought to be more likely to have committed a liquor law
violation than one whose record in that regard was
wholly clean. But allegations of former convictions of
any other sort of crime than one intimately connected
with the crime at issue would be bad even here. As was
said in People v. Meisner, et al., (Ill. 1924), 142 N. E. 483:
''A 1nan cannot be convicted of a crime because he is a bad man generally or has committed
other crimes for which he has not been punished,
tho evidence which tends to prove the offense
charged is not objectionable because it discloses
other offenses; the test of admissibility being the
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connection of the facts proved with the offense
charged.''
Aggravated offenses cases, are, of course, to be entirely
above.

distinguiE:~hed

from the lines of cases discussed

Under aggravated offenses statutes, a subsequ-

ent act to that for which the accused is being tried may
be shown to demonstrate wilful intent to do harm at the
time of the first act. Illustrations of this principle appear in criminal libel cases-, where libels subsequent to
that for which the accused is being tried may be put in
evidence to negative the possibility of mistake, or unintentional error.
In a fair trial, the accused has the power
to elect whether he will refuse to testify on the ground
of the privilege against self-incrimination or whether he
will take the stand in his own defense and subject himself to the normal rules of cross examination. If the
defendant elects pursue the former course, no evidence
may be introduced with regard to prior convictions, since
the rule is firmly and universally established that the
prosecution cannot initally attach the defendant's character. Whigmore, .cited supra, S. 57; 20 Am. Jur. § 325.
SECOND.

to

If the defendant elects to take the stand in his own
defense, and affirmatively attempts to show his good
character, the prosecution may in rebuttal offer evidence
as to his bad character, the reason being that the prosecution is at liberty to refute the claim of good character
as it could refute any other claim made by the opposing
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side. This is not a relaxation of the primary principle.
"\Vhigmore, cited supra, S. 58.
But if the defendant merely takes the stand in his
own defense, without affirn1atively putting his good character in issue, he is treated as any other witness, and is
subjec~,

on cross examination, to proper questions tend-

ing to shake his credibility. Section 104-49-20, R. S. Utah,
1933, requires this, that:
'' * * "' a witness must answer as to the fact
of his previous convictions for a felony.''
And the case of State v. Hougensen, 91 U. 359, 64 P.
(2d) 229 (1936), has laid down the rules which shall
govern in the event that a witness is required to answer
a question as to whether he has ever been convicted of
a felony, at p. 239 of the opinion:
''The inquiry n1ust end with the cross examination, altho not necessarily with the witness' answer to the particular question put.''
Should the witness answer in the affirmative, cumulative
evidence of the truth of the answer would be ruled out,
as adding nothing to the truth already established. Inflammatory matter, prejudicial to the accused in the .eyes
of the jury, such as rogues' gallery portraits, fingerprint
cards, and certified records, would then be excluded.
Should the witness deny that he had formerly been convicted of any felony, the prosecution could then proceed
with proper proof in refutation of the witness' claim.
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Contrast the procedure actually followed below,
wherein allegations of previous convictions were read to
the jury at the commencement of the trial and were considered as being part of the prosecution's case, to be
proved before the defense could proc~ed with its evidence.
Once these allegations and .evidence in support of them
reached the jury, of what value was the privilege against
self-incrimination to the accused~ Could he have anything left to lose by exposing himself to attack thru
taking the stand as, a witness in his own defense~ We
submit a sneak attack had already been made. Did he
have any opportunity whatsoever to decide whether he
would go further, and put his good character in issue~
Clearly he did not. By force of circumstances, he found
himself in a far worse situation than as if he had merely
become a witness in his own defense, or had gone further
and put in affirmative evidence of good character. It
goes without saying that he found himself infinitely worse
off than as if he had refused to take the stand as a witness in his own defense, and had he voluntarily assumed
the risk that the prosecution would interrogate him concerning prior convictions, he would have been assured
that such evidence of prior convictions, unless he denied
them, would be limited to a full and frank admission
on his part. Compare the rt)latively favorable impression such an admission would make upon a jury with the
impression to be made by the prosecution's introduction
of rogue's gallery portraits, fingerprint cards, and certified copies of court records, which could properly be admitted only if a witness denied he had ever been con-
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victed of a felony, and perhaps not even then. Would not
the accused here, by means of the introduction of documents and photographs highly inflamn1atory in character, in fact be placed in the position of having to carry the
burden of proof of his own good character, under almost
hopeless conditions, this in addition to the necessity of
proving he did not comnrit the crime for which he was
being tried? vV e submit that such was the-4ffect of the
procedure in the trial court.
In the instant case, the accused suffered the final
indignity in being subjected to such a procedure when,
under the holding of the Walsh case, supra, he could not
·properly have been deemed an habitual criminal at all,
in that it appears upon the face of the record that the
prior convictions alleged and proved as part of the proseen tion 's case did not meet the ''not less than three
years'' requirement of the habitual criminal act itself!
In other words, had Section 105-21-27 not been part of
the statutory law, and if the American and English rules
-with regard to fairness in the use of evidence did not
exist, still the allegation of prior crimes and evidence
thereon could not have been presented to the jury because
the crimes alleged did not fulfill the requirements of the
habitual criminal act as a matter of law.
One may liken the situation to that in which a drop
of poison is let fall into a glass of water - it may or
may not be sufficiently virulent to fatally affect a person
drinking it, but the water is no longer aqua pura, it has
become poisoned-water, in which two elements have been
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inextricably mixed.. Should a person drinking this
poisoned-water die immediately thereafter, one could not
determine whether he died as a result of drinking the
water or the poison or merely died coincidentally. But
in the absence of scientific tests establishing the contrary, a reasonable man would think it more likely than
not that death resulted from the element of poison introduced into the water. So, in the case of fundamental
unfairness in the use of evidence, one can never be certain that the ineradicable element .of unfairness has re- ·
suited in a miscarriage of justice, but where the unfairness goes to the heart of the proceeding, a reasonable
man would think it more likely than not tha~ a verdict
reached after the potentially fatal element of unfairness
has been introduced into the proceeding resulted in a
ver.dict which otherwise would not have been reached.
·Where such a likelihood exists, due process is absent, and
the proceeding is a nullity in the eyes of the law.
PoiNT

II.

IT liS SUBMITT'EID THAT EVEN IF THE PLAINTIFF HAD RE·
CEiiVEiD A FAIR AND IMPARTitAJL TRIAL ,JN THE COURT
BIDLOW, NJDV,ER.THEiLESS THE COURT ERJREiD IN FAILING
TO HOLD THAT THE SENT:E!NCE WAS VOID AND IN FAILING TO

DISOHARGE~

THE PLAINTIFF FROM OUSTODY

UNDER. THE S.ENiTENCE.

In the proceedings below, relator was found guilty
of "robbery and being an habitual criminal,'' and upon
this verdict the following judgment and sentence were
rendered:
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"The judgment. and sentence of this Court
is that you, Grover Thompson, be confined and imprisoned in the State Prison for a te'rm of not less
than fifteen years. ''
The jury's verdict of "robbery and being an habitual
criminal" represents: (1) a determination of fact with
respect to the allegations of robbery contained in the inforinatiou, and (2) a determination of fact as to the identity of the accused with the person who had been twice
previously convicted, sentenced, and commited as alleged
in the information.
Since the judgment and sentence of the court are
appropriate under the habitual criminal act, Section 1031-18, Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933, but are not appropriate for
the crin1e of robbery, they depend upon a determination
as a matter of law that the prior convictions alleged in
the infonnation satisfy the requirements of the habitual
criminal act. But since the prior convictions, sentences,
and commitments were not of "not less than three years
each,'' as required by the act (State v. Walsh, ___________ _
____ [1943] ) , the court was without power to impose
such a sentence. Nor, obviously, did the court have
power to impose such a sentence for robbery. This want
of power appears on the face of the record.
It is a settled rule that to render a judgment immune
from attack, the court must have had not only jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person of the defendant, but must also have had authority to render the
particular judgment in question~ and if either of these ·
elements is wanting the judgment is fatally defective and
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open to collateral attack. This is true because jurisdiction to render the sentence imposed is deemed as essential
to its validity as jurisdiction of the person or subject
matter. However, mere errors, omissions, or mistakes
in judgment or sentence render the sentence merely
voidable, and are correctable only by appeal or by writ
of error.
The question to be answered, then, is whether the
judgment and sentence imposed below are void or merely
voidable. Cases on this point appear in an exhaustive
annotation on ''Illegal or Erroneous S-entence as a
Ground for Habeas Corpus,'' 76 A. L. R. 468-514, following the leading case of Lee Lim v. Davis_, 75 U. 245, 284
P. 323, 76 A. L. R. 461 (1929). This annotation relates
solely to the question of whether a prisoner may be discharged on habeas ,corpus for errors, defects, or irregularities appearing on the face of the sentence, the court
having jurisdiction of the person and subject matter, and
a valid conviction having been rendered. The cases
present fact situations which require careful analysis,
and there is some apparent conflict, altho not a great
deal.
We submit that the cases require a determination
that in the case at bar the court was without p·ower to
impos·e the sentence it did~ that the sentence is therefore
void, at least in part, not merely voidable, and that relator
is entitled to relief from this void sentence. Whether
relator should be released entirely or whether a correct
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sentence should be in1posed, is not so clear, as will be
pointed out infra. See 29 C. J. p. 175.
Let us turn to the cases in which the sentences have
l1een held void as absolutely unauthorized or of an entirely different character from those authorized by law,
as, for example, where, on a verdict for a misdemeanor,
a sentence would be imposed as for a felony, (Ex parte
Burden, [1907] 92 Miss. 14, 131 Am. St. Rep. 511, 45 So.
1) or where, upon a conviction for burglary, the court
would sentence the prisoner to be hanged, (In re Fanton,
[1898] 55 Neb. 703, 70 Am. St. Rep. 418, 76· N. W. 447).
In all of these cases, the sentence was held void ab initio,
altho in some instances steps were taken to impose a
sentence appropriate to the facts found and in others the
prisoner obtained eornplete discharge.
A.

Cases in ''hich the prisoner was remanded for proper
sentence are :
1. Iu re Hughes (1917) 54 Mont. 153, 167 P. 650.

There the relator was sentenced to the state prison
for not less than seventeen nor more than twenty
years, altho the indeterminate sentence act provided that the minimum term should not exceed
one half of the maximum term. The court there
released the prisoner from the sentence, but held
that he should be remanded for a proper sentence.
2. Littlejohn v. SteHs (1905) 123 Ga. 427, 51 S. E.
390. There the only authorized punishment for
the offense of the relator was a fine or imprisonment but he was sentenced to work on the chain
gang: It was held that absolute discharge should
not be given, but that he should be remanded for
a proper sentence.
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B.

Cases in which prisoner was granted a complete discharge are:
1. State v. District Ct. (1907) 35 Mont. 321, 89 P. 63.
Prisoner was convicted of a misdemeanor but
sentenced to the penitentiary for fourteen years
as for a felony. It was held that the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction in rendering an entirely
different punishment from that prescribed by
statute.
2. State v. Gray (1875), 37 N.J. L. 368, 1 Am. Crim.
Rep. 554. Relator was sentenced to imprisonment
at hard labor for six months upon a conviction of
adultery, whereas the statute pe•rmitted imprisonment only. The judgment was held illegal and
relator discharged since a new judgment could
not be passed either in that co-qrt or in the court
below.
3. Bi ddle v. Thi·ele (1926; C.·C.A. 8th) 11 F. (2d) 235.
Where ·relator was charged with a second offense
under the National Prohibition Act but sentenced
as for a third offense, the sentence was held excessive and totally void because the excessive portion thereof could not be separated from the legal
portion. Note, tho, that the discharge was without
prejudice to the government to take steps toward
resentence.
1

Attention is invited at _this point also to those cases
in which the sentence was unauthorized because of indefiniteness and therefor held void and the plaintiff given
his discha•rge on habeas corpus. See Rasmussen v. Zwndel (1926), 67 Utah 456, 248 P. 135, and Lee Lim v. Darvis,
cited supra. In the Lee Lim case, the petitioner was discharged without prejudice to the rights of the state to
initiate further appropriate proceedings.
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In another group of cases, altho the sentence was
not held void ab initio, or totally void, the plaintiff was
unifonnly given relief from the illegal part of such sentence. Since this relief was given on collateral attack,
the sentence was in fact considered partially void and
given effect only in so far as the power of the court
extended. In some of these cases, relief was not then
granted, on the ground that the valid portion had not
yet been served and plaintiff could not therefo:r complain. H·owever, the courts almost uniformly granted
plaintiff his discharge when the valid portion had already
been served, and furthermore, often granted relief in
the form of a corrected sentence even where the valid
portion of the sentence had not yet been served. Typical
of these cases are the following~ in all of which the attack
was by habeas corpus:
A.

Prisoner discharged after the proper sentences was
served:
1. :Munson v. McOlaughry (1912), 42 L.R.A. (N. E.)

302, 117 C.C.A. 180, 198 F. 72. A prisoner who bad
served a sentence for burglary with intent to commit larceny was discharged from a sentence for
larceny which, it was held, the court bad no power
to impose.
2. In Re Stewart (1884), 16 Neb. 193, 20 N. W. 255.
People ex rei Carlstrom v. Eller (1926), 323 Ill.
28, 153 N. E. 597, 49 A.L.R. 490. Prisoners in
these cases were wrongfully ~entenced to both
fine and imP'risonment. They were discharged
upon payment of the fines.
3. In re Bolden (1910), 159 Mich. 629, 124 N. W. 548.
Prisoner was sentenced to prison f'Or a term of
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from two and one half to eight years, altho the
legal imprisonment for his crime was imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one
year. Since the prisoner had already served
about four years, he was given an absolute release.
B.

Discharge refused until the legal sentence be served:
1. Reese v. Olsen (1914), 44 U. 318, 139 P. 941. The

court there had power to impose a fine and imprisonment, but went further and alS'o imposed
a sentence of imprisonment until the fine be paid.
It was held that since the· legal and illegal terms
of imprisonment were separable, the p·risoner
would not be r~leased on habeas corpus until the
legal term was served.
2. State v. Ho'oker (1922), 183 N. C. 763, 111 S. E.
351. Relator was jailed for thirty days and given
a $200 fine for contempt. It was held he must
serve the legal part of the sentence: thirty days
in jail and payment of a $50 fine.
C.

Prisoner remanded for proper senience:
1. Ex Parte Simmons (1878), 62 Ala. 416. Relator
was convicted of burglary and sentenced to three
years at\hard labor. Where such hard labor could
not prope-rly exceed two years, prisoner was remanded for proper sentence.

2. Com. v. Curry (1926), 285 Pa. 289, 132 A. 370.
Convicted of attempted burlgary, the petitioner
was improperly sentenced as an habitual offender
to imprisonment of not less than seven years and
six n1onths and not more than thirty years. The
statute applicable to the offe:n.se provided for imprisonment not to exceed ten years. The sentence
was held illegal and the record remanded for a
proper resentence.
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D. Sentence corrected or modified and affirmed:

1. Ex parte Harlan (1909; C. C.), 180 F. 119 (decree
affirmed in (1910) 218 U. S. 442, 54 L. Ed. 1101, 31
S. Ct. 44, 21 Ann. Cas. 849). There the prisoner
was convicted of an offense with a statutory
punishment of a "penalty'' and imprisonment for
not more than two years. The sentence conformed
to the statute as to the penalty and length of imprisonment, but imposed imprisonment at "hard
labor.'' It was held that to the extent of the
court's excess of jurisdiction the sentence was
anullity, and the sentence was amended nunc
pro tunc by expunging the part imposing ''hard
labor.''
E.

Proper .sentence imposed, and prisoner remanded:
1. Haldern1an's Petiti'on (1923), 276 Pa. 1, -119 A.
735. In that case, the ·court's failure to make the
sentences on two counts run concurrently caused
them to run "Cumulatively, thereby making the
punishment in excess of the ten year penalty authorized by statute. It was he'ld that since the·
minimu1n sentence rendered was within the ten
year limit, it was voidable only. The sentence was
corrected to conform to the statute.

But compare the following cases:
A. Harrison v. Moyer (1915; D. C.), 224 F. 224.
Prisoner was convicted of conspiracy, for which
the statute provided imprisonment for not over
two years, but was sentenced to five years under
a. statute which the trial judge deemed applicable.
It was held that the error should have been corrected by a writ of error and that habeas corpus
did not lie.
B. McElhanev v. Fenton (1927), 115 Neb. 299, 212
N. W. 612. The prisoner was sentenced to from
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three to twenty years altho the statute provided
for a punishment of from one to ten years. It
was held that the fixing of the sentence was erroneous but that it eould have been corrected by
proper proceedings in error.
Let us contrast with the foregoing, the cases in which
the court rejected the elaim of total or partial invalidity.
These cases involve merely a failure to conform to
technical statutory requirernents. It is the common and
outstanding characteristic of these cases that the prisoner
cannot really claim that he has been harmed, and he is
therefor not discharged.

Typical of. this situation are

the following cases :
A. Connella v. Haskell (1907), 87 C. ·C. A. 111, 158 F.
285. There petitioner was sentenced to five years
imprisonment for each of two offenses, the terms
to run concurrently. The statute provided that
such sentences shall be cumulative. Such irregularity was held not to ·render the sentence void.
B. Carter v. :Snook (1928; C. C. A. 5th), 28 F. (2d)
609. The total of the erroneous sentence did not
exceed the sum of the sentences which could properly have been imposed.
C. Ex Parte Tanner (1929), 219 Ala. 7, 121 So. 423;
In re Casey (1902), 27 Wash. 686, 68 P. 185. In
these cases, the judges fixed proper sentences
where the juries failed in their required duty of
imposing sentence.
D. O'Neill v. Jordan (1914), 5 Alaska 81; Re Barton
(1889), 6 Utah 264, 21 P. 998. In these cases, the
prisoners were sentenced without their consent
within six hours after the verdict, contrary to
statute in this respect.
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E. Re Hemstreet (1912), 18 Cal. App. 639, 123 P. 984.
There the justice failed to pronounce judgment
of sentence within the time fixed by statute.
F. Ex Parte Beeler (1899), 41 Tex. Crim. Redp. 240,
53 S. vV. 857. There the clerk inserted a wrong
nan1e in entering the final judgment of sentence
in the minutes of the court.
G. Re Burger ( 1878), 39 Mich. 203. :Mere misnan1ing
of prisoner where he was sufficiently designated
to preclude a mistake.
H. Re \Vinslow (1915), 91 Ohio St. 328, 110 N. E. 539.
There a burglar was sentenced to remain in prison
"until discharged by due process of law" when
the only statute applicable required a sentence
of from one to fifteen years.
But compare the following case:
A. Ex parte Lyde ( 1920), 17 Okla. Crim. Rep. 618,
191 P. 606. Here the sentence was imposed on the
defendant in his absence, contrary to statute, and
the court held the sentence illegal and void, entitling relator to his discharge on habeas corpus,
subject to remand for sentence in accordance with
his conviction.
In the case at bar, a sentence was in1posed appropriate to the status of habitual criminality. Such a sentence
is wholly unauthorized for the crime of robbery nor was
it authorized upon the pleadings in this case for the
status of habitual criminality.

The irregularity com-

plained of is not merely technical but seriously damages
the plaintiff and goes to the jurisdiction or power of the
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court to impose the particular sentence in question. See
12 R. C. L., pp. 1197, 1209.
It foHows, then, that one 'Of four results should be
reached by this court :
A. The prisoner should be completely discharged;
B. The prisoner should be discharged from the particular sentence without prejudice to further proceedings to enforce the -conviction of robbery;
·C. The prisoner should be remanded for the imposition of a valid sentence; ·Or,
D. The sentence should be modified or corrected by
this court.
It is submitted that inasmuch as the prigoner may be
recommitted for· robbery by legal order or process (Section 104-65-22, Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933), justice would be
done both the prisoner and the state by the adoption of
the second .course of action. :See also Lee Lim v. Davis,
cited supra. However, since habeas corpus proceedings
contemplate disposition of the prisoner according to justice and the law, we submit that this court has plenary
power to enter the sentence appropr~ate to the conviction, nunc pro tunc, expunging from the record the void
sentence imposed by the court below. If the court be
inclined toward the complete discharge of the relator,
it has respectable case authority f·or taking such a position.
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CONCLUSION
In the light of the foregoing argument and authorities, we submit that two questions require a rehearing
in this case :

First: Can it be said that relator has enjoyed due
process of law! We submit that he has not, for these
reasons:
A fair and impartial trial is guaranteed every defendant in a criminal proceeding by both state and federal constitutions. The procedure followed below, permitting the introduction of matters extraneous to the
case and highly prejudicial in character, rendered the
relator repugnant to the jury, prevented him from obtaining a fair trial, and deprived him of due process of law.
A denial of due process results in the complete invalidity
of the unfair proceedings. V'oid proceedings are subject to attack on habeas corpus and require the discharge
of relator, subject to retrial on the question of robbery.
Second: Can it be said that the court below had
jurisdiction to impose the .Particular sentence it did upon
the relator 1 We submit that it did not, for these reasons:
A judgment and sentence, in order to be immune
from collateral attack, must be within the power of the
court to impose. The sentence imposed below was appropriate to the status of habitual criminality, but utterly
unauthorized for the crime of robbery, the only issue
presented by the allegations of the pleadings. Such a
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void sentence is reachable by habeas corpus, and requires
the discharge of relator, subject to proper steps being
taken to impose a valid sentence.
I

The plaintiff submits that the. writ of habeas corpus
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
DoROTHEA MERRILL DRYER,

Attorney for Plaintiff,
Amicus Curiae, by appointment of the Supreme Court.

· ... ··
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